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 Abstract 
Recent years there has been an increased usage of dark pools followed by a rise in interest to 
study the field. During 2018, 14% of the US equity trading was made in dark pools. It is 
therefore highly relevant to consider dark pools effect on market qualities such as asset price 
volatility. This thesis investigates if there is a relation between dark pool trading and asset price 
volatility on the US equity market during the time period of 2015-2019. A quantitative method 
has been applied by running two regressions with time fixed effects on historical data. With 
statistical significance, the thesis suggests that there is a relation. Further, the results imply that 
there is an increasing effect on asset price volatility when dark trading percentage is high. The 
thesis is based on historical data for 100 stocks in the national market system tier 1 listed as 
alternative trading systems who report to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. 
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1. Introduction 
Dark pools or dark markets are private exchanges for security trading where trading is 
performed in the absence of order books (Mizuta et al., 2015). Dark trading, as the terms 
implies, is characterized by lack of transparency (ibid). Even though the term “dark pool” is 
relatively new, the concept has been used for a long time and was initially called upstairs trading 
(Foley and Putniņš, 2016). Historically dark pools were used by large institutions buying large 
asset volumes (Zhu, 2013). As stated by Mizuta et al. (2015), large orders can send strong buy 
or sell signals to the market, which might consequently affect the market price. It is further 
explained that some investors choose to trade in dark pools to avoid this problem. This since 
intentions of buying or selling requires publication in the public market. The risk of such an 
action is sudden and abnormal fluctuations in the market price. Since transactions in dark pools 
are not published until after it is executed, the risk of price fluctuations is reduced (Mizuta et 
al., 2015).  
 
How large percentage part of the total trading done in dark pools is not all clear. Bain, (2018) 
reports that dark pools represent 14% of US equity trading in 2018. Furthermore, over 60% of 
the participants were investment banks and the other 40% was represented by market makers, 
independent investors and broker consortiums. Petrescu and Wedow (2017) report that the 
market share of dark pools in Europe has grown from less than 1% in 2009 to be slightly below 
10% in 2017. Further, they state that banks and brokers account for over 50% of the volume 
traded and that other operators on the dark market are principally entities ran by public 
exchanges.  
 
Zhu, (2013) describes the participation in dark pools as a trade-off between a possible price 
improvement and a risk of no execution. Further, he states that the probability of no execution 
is more extensive in a dark pool than in the public market, since order execution requires 
matching orders i.e. a counterparty placing a matching order on the opposite side of the market. 
If no matching order is placed there will be no execution and the order will be delayed (for 
example, see appendix 3). Ye, (2009) claims that in dark pools, executions have no immediate 
price impact since the action is not public. Thus, the probability of execution will decrease 
when the order size is increased. He explains that as the prices in a dark pool are indirectly 
dependent on the execution prices in the public exchange and orders are matched using these 
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prices as a benchmark. Hence, profits made in dark pools indirectly depend on the trading made 
in the public exchange.  
 
In order to create more liquidity, dark pools are not restricted to large institutions trading large 
volumes anymore (Zhu, 2013). Dark pools are becoming more attractive to smaller and 
individual investors, mainly because of the reduction of execution costs (Petrescu and Wedow, 
2017). The large institutional investors are still the main trader in dark pools though (Mizuta et 
al. 2015). Both banks and brokers are large dark pool actors, by using their own dark pools they 
can avoid paying fees in order to participate in the public market (Petrescu and Wedow, 2017). 
As Petrescu and Wedow (2017) explain, it is in fact up to the ones managing the dark pools to 
decide on restrictions about volumes and participants as well as other rules to apply. They also 
claim that, as the high-frequency trading is increasing, the prevalence of dark pools is also 
increasing because of the protection from this action. National authorities are monitoring these 
operations and interests and requirements of control and managing are growing when the 
market share of dark pools increases (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010). 
 
The rising attention and usage of dark pools have brought light to the topic and an increased 
interest to further study the subject. In particular the urge to analyze the impact of dark pools 
on public markets. Studies are inconsistent in the advantages and disadvantages of dark pool 
usage as well as the impact on public markets. Petrescu and Wedow (2017) present a few 
implications on why dark pool activity, on one hand, may lead to increased volatility and an 
overall reduction in market stability, but on the other hand, it might lead to the complete 
opposite. Hence, reduced volatility and an overall improvement of market stability. The first 
implication is consistent with the studies of O’Hara and Ye (2011) as well as Garvey, Huang, 
and Wu (2016). The effect is explained as when orders are relocated from public exchanges 
into dark pools, the information in the public order books are reduced. Since prices are formed 
in order books, less information in the price formation might lead to increased price volatility.   
 
The second implication is consistent with Ye (2009), Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), Foley, 
Malinova, and Park (2013). Petrescu and Wedow (2017) expand the previous assumption by 
accounting for how different type of traders, informed and uninformed, will behave when 
choosing a trading venue. The implication is that informed traders will concentrate on the public 
exchange and uninformed traders will relocate to dark markets in order to make a profit. A 
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larger concentration of informed traders on the public exchange will improve price formation 
and reduce price volatility. 
 
The central focus of this study is to examine the relation between price volatility and dark pool 
activity. Since the main reason for dark pool usage is to reduce market impact and abnormal 
fluctuations in asset prices, the intuition might be that price volatility in public markets should 
be reduced with increasing usage of dark pools. Thus, this does not always seem to be the case. 
 
1.2. Problem definition 
As already mentioned, previous studies on the effect of dark pool trading activity on public 
markets are inconclusive. Since extensive empirical research has to be made in order to account 
for all aspects to predict the causal effect of dark trading on the market, researchers usually 
focus on one or a few measures. The market can be affected in many ways, related literature 
mainly focuses on market factors such as price discovery, market efficiency, market stability, 
liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. Since dark pools are facing growing demand 
and gaining market shares, further studies would be interesting. The lack of transparency and 
detailed data available have limited the range of studies made on the subject. 
 
A question that caught our interest was how dark pool trading affects volatility in stock prices. 
Since the main reason for using dark pools is to prevent abnormal volatility, is it plausible to 
predict the volatility to decrease when dark pool activity in the stock is increased? The focus of 
this thesis is to examine the volatility of market prices for stocks traded on the US equity market 
and how it is affected by the proportion of dark pools in relation to total volume traded. In order 
to do so, two null hypotheses are constructed as follows:  
 
Null hypothesis I: The proportion of dark pool trading relative to total volume of shares traded 
does not affect the volatility of asset prices. 
 
Alternative hypothesis I: The proportion of dark pool trading relative to total volume of shares 
traded does affect the volatility of asset prices. 
 
Null hypothesis II: The relative effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility will not 
change regardless of the proportion dark pool trading relative to total volume of shares traded. 
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Alternative hypothesis II: The relative effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility will 
change when the proportion of dark pool trading relative to total volume of shares traded is 
changed. 
 
We believe that our thesis will contribute to the research on the topic since it will broaden the 
perspective by looking at the effect on price volatility. The increasing usage of dark markets 
has led to a situation where new regulations are needed. It is therefore of interest to further 
study how the public stock market is affected, as a foundation for policymakers when 
developing new regulations. Even though some studies include price volatility as one possible 
explanatory variable for dark pool trading it is rarely the main focus. While many studies focus 




The purpose of this thesis is to examine the association between the market share of dark pool 
trading and asset price volatility. The aim is to conclude whether dark pools are desirable or not 
in the perspective of market stability. Furthermore, if the effect of dark pool trading changes 
with the level of usage.  
 
1.4. Thesis structure 
The study is organized as followed. In the second section, theoretical implications that 
constitute a foundation for the study are described as well as previous research made on the 
subject. In the third section, the process of data collection is described. In the fourth section, 
the methodology and the actual performance of the study are presented. The fifth section states 
the empirical results reached in previous sections. In the sixth section, the result is discussed. 
In the seventh, and last section the study is concluded.    
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2. Theoretical framework and literature review 
This section will present previous studies on the topic and the theoretical framework related to 
this study will be described. Since this subject is relatively unexplored means that previous 
research is limited. Moreover, the lack of transparency and detailed data available limits the 
range of studies made on dark pools. 
 
As already pointed out, the studies about dark pools and the effect on public markets are 
inconclusive. Different market factors are used in different studies to describe the effect of dark 
pools on the public market. When searching the literature, we have found a few studies that 
include dark pool trading as one possible explanatory variable for price volatility, rarely it is 
the main focus though. Many studies focus on the opposite relation, that is, how price volatility 
affects the usage of dark pools. 
 
Ye (2009), Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), Foley, Malinova and Park (2013) and Petrescu, 
Wedow and Lari (2016) consistently claim that an increased market share of dark pool trading 
will reduce volatility. However, all of them perform different explanations of why such a 
relationship appears. Foley, Malinova, and Park (2013) find that increased dark pool trading 
leads to a reduction of intraday price impact and volatility. The other way around, Buti, Rindi, 
and Werner (2011) rather finds the reversed relation, that is, low intraday volatility is one reason 
for increased dark pool activity. 
 
A common theoretical implication about why increased dark pool activity is associated with 
lower volatility is based on the behavior of different types of traders. Foley and Putniņš, (2016) 
as well as Zhu (2013) explains the concept and describes the importance of accounting for these 
when describing the behavior of investors in the market. Since traders have different goals, they 
will act in different ways. The types of traders are often divided into informed, uninformed and 
liquidity traders (Foley and Putniņš, 2016). Informed traders can predict the direction of the 
price and therefore beat the market. Uninformed traders, as the term imply, trades without 
having access to information about the market. Liquidity traders are not investing to get the 
best possible future payoff, they invest to fulfill their liquidity needs i.e. selling when they need 
liquidity, buying when they have liquidity (Zhu, 2013). Their trades are triggered by exogenous 
factors and do not relate to available market information. Liquidity traders are often big 
institutions or hedge funds (Ibid). 
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Zhu (2013), Foley, Malinova and Park (2013), Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) and 
Petrescu, Wedow and Lari (2016) all states that increased dark pool activity is associated with 
lower volatility. The interpretation of that is the behavior of informed and uninformed investors 
when meeting fluctuating volatility in asset prices. Informed traders tend to concentrate on the 
public market. This will increase the information in the public market and therefore make order 
books and prices more informative, the increased information will improve the process of price 
formation. Also, uninformed traders will relocate from the public markets into dark pools 
because of the difficulties to make a profit among the informed investors. They all conclude 
that the increased concentration of informed investors in the public market as well as more 
information in the prices will decrease price volatility. On the other hand, this division between 
investors will increase the adverse selection risk (Zhu, 2013 and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 
2015).  
 
In contrast, O’Hara and Ye (2011), Huang and Wu (2016), as well as Petrescu and Wedow 
(2017), presents a different theory on the association between dark pool activity and price 
volatility. That is, increased dark pool activity may lead to increased price volatility and an 
overall reduction of market stability and price volatility. Petrescu and Wedow (2017) 
explanation are that market participants are more likely to relocate to the dark markets when 
market conditions in the public market are less profitable. High volatility indicates such an 
environment and will further increase the intention to invest in dark trading (ibid). Further, they 
state, when orders are relocated from public exchanges into dark pools, the information in the 
public order books are reduced. Prices are formed in order books and when prices on the public 
market contain less information, prices are more uncertain leading to increased volatility and 
reduced market stability (Petrescu and Wedow, 2017). Less information in price formation 
might lead to increased price volatility (ibid). 
 
Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) on the other hand imply that traders are more likely to trade on 
the public exchange when volatility is high. They explain the finding as the market participants 
want to avoid the additional risk of no execution related to dark pools when market conditions 
are already bad. Petrescu, Wedow and Lari (2016) find similar results as O’Hara and Ye (2011), 
Garvey, Huang and Wu (2016) as well as Petrescu and Wedow (2017) but only for smaller dark 
pool trading venues where daily average trading volume is low. The relation might occur 
because these types of venues attract informed traders rather than uninformed because of the 
high volatility (Petrescu, Wedow and Lari, 2016). 
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Why these completely opposite results appear is hard to predict. Theory about the impact of 
dark pool trading on asset price volatility seems to correspond to the vitality of information 
available in prices and the process of forming those. In which way it is fulfilled is, on the other 
hand, not as certain and different explanations will impact on the results. Thus, the studies are 
all performed in different ways using different methods, time spans, markets, assumptions as 
well as they all have different objectives to focus on. Probably these disparities will affect the 
performance as well as the results of the studies. For example, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) 
have selected 11 dark pool in the US, while Petrescu, Wedow, and Lari (2016) are looking at 
specific dark pool trading venues in Europe, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) using data 
from multiple markets including the USA, Canada, and Australia. Also, Foley, Malinova, and 
Park (2013) study the Canadian market. 
 
Zhu (2013), Preece and Rosov (2014), Foley and Putniņš (2016) point out the importance of 
considering different types of dark pool trading systems when looking at the effect of dark pool 
trading on the market. Theory suggests two types of dark trading, the first trading system means 
trading at one single price (one-sided) (Foley and Putniņš, 2016). Such as a midpoint crossing 
system similar to the midpoint of national best bid and offer (NBBO). The midpoint system 
executes orders in the middle of the bid and ask spread (ibid). Since neither of the traders has 
to pay the full spread the system is associated with lower execution costs (Petrescu and Wedow, 
2017). Further, the liquidity will only exist on one side of the buy-sell side and the system 
implies a zero spread, meaning orders will be concentrated on one side, either buy or sell side. 
The second trading system corresponds to a limit order market, similar to public markets where 
it is possible to place an order at the preferred price (Zhu, 2013). Liquidity can be available on 
both sides of the spread, indicating a spread separate from zero (Petrescu and Wedow, 2017). 
Foley and Putniņš (2016) and Preece and Rosov (2014) intend that the different trading systems 
will change the probability of execution, trading strategies and the information available which 
will all impact on the public market. Foley and Putniņš (2016) find evidence that a one-sided 
system will reduce price volatility and that the two-sided system will have an overall positive 
impact on the market. For an example of the two different systems, see appendix 3. 
 
Whether it is the volatility itself that affects the market share of dark pools or if it is the other 
way around is not very clear when looking at the literature. Though, the majority of the above 
research stresses the importance of accounting for disparities among investors when looking 
for relations between dark pool activity and market factors. When analyzing the literature, price 
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volatility seem to be dependent on the actions of informed and uninformed investors. One 
important implication of the discussion is that market participants seem to respond to the price 
volatility and relocate their orders when price volatility is changed. Another important 
implication in a few of the mentioned studies is the relevance of different kinds of dark pool 
trading systems and how these have a different effect on the public markets which might have 
an impact on the results. To account for different types of traders as well as different kinds of 
dark pool trading systems are not in the scope of our study. Our study will rather examine the 
overall impact of dark pool trading and whether it is desirable or not in the aspect of price 
volatility in the public market. Although, the mentioned aspects will be discussed as possible 
explanatory reasons for our result, which will be based on the related literature introduced.  
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3. Data Collection  
In this section, the process of data collection will be described. Specifically, where the data 
used in the study is extracted as well as which databases used in the purpose of doing so. 
 
3.1. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
The transaction data related to dark pools are all collected from the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in their database for alternative trading systems (ATS) 
transparency data. ATSs are non-regulated exchanges that do not publicly disclose pre-trade 
information to the public. Dark pools are one type of an alternative trading system but the terms 
are, in studies, often applied as synonyms. In our study, the transaction data derived from 
FINRA will be used as a proxy for dark pool transactions.  
 
In 2014 SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) approved a rule, Regulatory Notice 14-
07, of reporting requirements of ATS data (FINRA, 2014). The new rule means that ATS 
facilities are required to report weekly transactions to FINRA. Furthermore, equity volume, as 
well as the number of securities, needs to be reported. As the requirements were implemented, 
FINRA is making the reports publicly available, though with some time of delay. 
 
We have selected the 1,662 assets in the national market system (NMS) tier 1 listed as ATSs 
on FINRA. The assets in NMS tier 1 are derived from the S&P 500, Russel 1000 as well as 
selected exchange-traded products. Out of the 1,662 assets, 100 company stocks were randomly 
selected. Since the regulations regarding publishing post-trade data for ATSs is fairly new, 
FINRA reports from 2015 and onwards. Hence, we will use data from 2015-01-01 to 2019-04-
12 which implies 223 weeks. With more than four years of data compounded into weekly 
observations in combination with a sample size of 100 different shares, the data result in 22,300 
observations and is considered as a satisfying amount of observations for this study. 
 
The data collected from FINRA is the total volume of shares traded in different dark pools for 
each stock. All data collected is on a weekly basis and for all shares, the weekly trade sizes in 
the different dark pool venues are summarized to a total amount for each share. Resulting in a 
weekly trading size for each share and week.  
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3.2. Bloomberg terminal 
From the Bloomberg terminal, we extracted data on the trading volumes on all available 
markets for each stock and week. We also collected the market capitalizations for each stock 
and week. We use this data to calculate the percentage volume of trading in dark pools as will 
be presented in the following section. Further, we collected daily closing prices from 
Bloomberg in order to calculate the daily return, which is also explained in the following 
section. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 




1.473 1.188 24.728 0 1.1300 22,200 
Dark percentage 
(%) 
12.634 12.733 65.111 0 5.947 22,200 
Total volume 
(M) 
13.840 7.904 647.620 0.178 17.600 22,200 
Market cap. 
(MUSD) 
26,906 10,569 544,570 700.330 54,817 22,200 
Avg. trade size 147.870 149.920 912.680 0 61.385 22,200 
Note to table 1: Dark percentage is the percentage of dark pool trading relative to total trading, Avg. 
trade size is the average trade size in the dark market measured in units of shares and Lag RV is the 
lagged value of the realized volatility for one time period, in this case one week. Total volume is 
measured in millions units. Number of observations is measured in units.  
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data used in this thesis. The data represents the 
entire sample period from 2015-01-01 to 2019-04-12. As stated in the table, the average 
percentage of dark pool trading per week is at 12.6 % which is in line with the average for the 
US equity market at 14% (Baines, 2018). The highest percentage in this sample is 65.1%. 
Regarding the realized volatility, the average for the period is 1.47% while the highest value is 
24.73%.  
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4. Method 
In this section, we describe the way of processing the data mentioned in the previous section. 
Further, a description of the method used for the empirical findings as well as the process to 
compute the econometric models follows. 
 
4.1. Dark pool calculations 
The data collected in the previous section is used to calculate the percentage of dark pool trading 
volume (equation 1). By dividing the Total number of shares traded in dark pools with the total 
number of trades in dark pools the average trade size for each stock in the dark market is 
calculated (equation 2). 
 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = -./0	123456728.3	1234569-./0	123456 	𝑥	100    (1) 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑒	𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = -./0	123456-./0	8/.C6D     (2) 
 
Total volume = total number of shares traded 
Dark volume = total number of shares traded in dark pools 
Dark trades = total number of trades in dark pools 
 
4.2. Realized Volatility 
We use realized volatility as a measure for asset price volatility. Realized volatility will be the 
dependent variable in the regression model. Since realized volatility is the historical volatility 
of asset returns, it is more appropriate in our study than implied volatility. Unlike implied 
volatility, which reflects the future volatility, realized volatility measures what have already 
happened (Nasdaq, 2019). Regularly, realized volatility is calculated by summarizing the 
squared intraday returns giving the realized volatility for a specific day, which can be processed 
into weekly, monthly or annual volatility. Using the same method as for daily realized volatility 
using intraday returns, it is possible to use a longer time frame, although it will not have the 
same accuracy (Andersen et al., 2001). The method of calculating the volatility from daily 
rather than intraday data were often used before the technic made accessibility to such as easy 
as today (Liu and Tse, 2013). When calculating weekly volatility from daily data, only five 
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return observation will be used to calculate each weekly estimate (ibid). That is why the method 
might lead to estimation errors (ibid). Anyhow, to fit the characteristics of the dark pool data 
provided, weekly realized volatility will be used and calculated from daily closing prices. 
The first step in calculating the weekly realized volatility is to calculate the daily return of an 
asset. This is done using the logarithmic forms of the closing prices as shown in the formula 
below:  
 𝑟C = log(𝑃C) − log(𝑃CLM)			   (3) 
 
d = day 
rd = return of day d 
Pd = Closing price of day d 
Pd-1= Closing price of the previous day to day d (d-1)  
 
Liu and Tse (2013) states that in order to calculate volatility for a month or a shorter time frame, 
in our case weekly, the daily returns (𝑟8) for the period are squared and summarized. The sum 
of the squared returns represents the realized variance for this study, which catches the price 
variations over the week. 
 𝑅𝑉𝑎𝑟8,Q(R) = ∑ 𝑟C,QTUQVM     (4) 
 
d = day 
t = the aggregation period, time interval of one week  
i = the equity instrument 
rd,i = daily return for one equity instrument 
RVart,I = Realized variance for one week and equity instrument 
N = total number of days in the week (N=5) 
w =indicates the weekly time span 
 
By taking the square root of the realized variance, the realized volatility is received.  
 𝑅𝑉8,Q(R) = W𝑅𝑉𝑎𝑟8,Q(R)    (5) 
 
t = the aggregation period, time interval of one week  
i = the equity instrument 
  13 
RVt,i= Realized volatility for one week 
RVart,i= Realized variance for one week 
w = indicates the weekly time span 
 
4.3. The regression models 
We evaluate the relationship between the stock price volatility of the stocks trading on the US 
equity market and the proportion of dark trading for these stocks. We use a classical linear 
regression model (CLR). When using the CLR model, there are five basic assumptions that 
need to be accounted for (Kennedy, 2009). For this data set heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are present, which violates one of the assumptions of the CLR model. In order 
to account for this, the option cluster is used. The result of the tests made can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
 
The data used is of panel type. The main advantage of using panel data is the correction for 
heterogeneity, as well as the exploiting of information, giving better analysis of dynamic 
adjustment (Kennedy, 2009). Further, it gives more efficient estimations from combining cross-
sectional variation with time-dependent variation. 
 
The model used to test the null hypothesis is a fixed effects model. This type of model assumes 
the same slopes and a constant variance for the cross-sections while examining the individual 
differences in intercepts (Park, 2011). One of the biggest drawbacks with this model is that 
degrees of freedom are being lost, leading to less efficient estimates of the common slope 
(Kennedy, 2009).  
 
As explained by Kennedy (2009) the fixed effects model estimates short-run effects since the 
estimator is based on the time series component of the data. When the difference between short- 
and long-run reactions is expected, it is further explained that these dynamics need to be built 
into the model. Thus, a lagged value of the realized volatility is included in our model.  
 
When using a lagged value of the dependent variable in a fixed effects model, the estimators 
are biased. However, when the number of time periods is greater than 30 this can be off seen 
by the greater precision, which is underlined by Attansio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000). 
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4.3.1. Regression I 
The regression model is inspired by the one used by Baskin (1989) as well as other relevant 
studies on stock price volatility (Ilaboya and Aggreh (2013), Shah and Noreen (2016), Seng 
and Yang (2017) and Zainudin et al. (2018)). They all use volatility as a dependent variable in 
a regression model to test their explanatory variables effect on stock price volatility. In 
accordance with Ilaboya and Aggreh (2013), a fixed effect model with panel data is used to test 
this relationship. As for the variable of interest, we use the percentage of trading in dark pools. 
Since the volatility is affected by multiple variables, we decided to control for some of these. 
Following the mentioned studies (Baskin (1989), Ilaboya and Aggreh (2013), Shah and Noreen 
(2016), Seng and Yang (2017) and Zainudin et al. (2018)), market capitalization is included as 
a control variable. In addition to this, the total trading volume for the stocks, average dark 
trading size and a time lag of one week for the realized volatility are included. 
 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦Q,8 = 𝛼 + 𝛽M𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒Q,8 + 𝛽T𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒Q,8 +𝛽a𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Q,8 + 𝛽c𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒Q,8 +𝛽d𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑	𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦Q,8 + 𝜀Q,8   (6) 
 
i = the equity instrument 
t = the aggregation period, time interval of one week 𝛼 = intercept 𝛽MLd= the slope coefficient for the variables  
Dark percentage = the percentage of trading in dark pools 
Total volume = the total trading volume 
Market capitalization = the current market capitalization 
Average trade size = average dark trade size 
Lagged realized volatility = realized volatility for t-1 𝜀 = error term 
 
We expect the variable of dark percentage to have a decreasing effect on the dependent variable. 
This because it is plausible to believe that the lower market impact due to dark pool trading 
would decrease the volatility, which coincides with the results of Ye (2009), Buti, Rindi, and 
Werner (2011), and Foley, Malinova and Park (2013). For the variable total volume, we expect 
a positive sign implying that a more traded stock would have higher volatility. Regarding the 
variable market capitalization, we expect a negative sign. This in accordance with Christie 
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(1982) who imply that bigger firms tend to be less volatile. For average trade size, we expect a 
negative sign, since large trades on the public exchange tend to have a high market impact, thus 
trading the same amount in a dark pool instead would plausibly mitigate the effect on price 
volatility (Mizuta et al., 2015). 
 
4.3.2. Regression II 
To further test the relation between dark pool trading activity and asset price volatility we 
expand the data set by including dummy variables. The dummy variables are constructed to 
represent whether dark pool trading activity is high or low. High and low values are defined by 
calculating the mean of the percentage of dark pool trading in relation to total trades (Dark 
percentage). Thus, because of some shares absence of dark pool trading during certain time 
spans, these periods will be excluded from the mean. It is done in order to keep the mean from 
being deceptive i.e. long time periods of non-dark pool trading will decrease the mean, 
sometimes severe. After the mean is calculated, the 20 shares with the highest as well as the 20 
shares with the lowest mean are selected for the dummies. The 20 shares with the highest mean 
go from 15.55%. The 20 shares with the lowest mean go up to 11.9%. 
 
Whether dark pool trading affects the price volatility is tested using the first regression. The 
purpose of the other regression model is to test whether low percentages of dark pool trading 
relative to total trades significantly differs from high ones and if it is a change in the marginal 
effect of dark pool trading. To test this, we will create interaction terms of the dummy variables 
and the percentage of dark pool trading.  Testing this will tell us if dark pool trading is preferred 
at a high or low level in the aspect of asset price volatility. This regression is compounded to 
estimate the effect of low and high proportion of dark pool trading in relation to total trades 
(Dark percentage). The dependent variable is once again realized volatility.  
 
Fixed effect is not possible to apply when using dummy variables. The effect will be 
differentiated away because of the time dummies created by the demand. It is only possible to 
use time-varying variables and since the dummy in our case is constant for entities over the 
whole time span it will be omitted by Stata. Instead, we will use an OLS model and adjust it to 
keep the fixed effect for both time and entities. 
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 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦Q,8 = 𝛼 + 𝛽M𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒Q,8 + 𝛾M𝐿𝑜𝑤	𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 +𝛾T𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾a(𝐿𝑜𝑤	𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	 × 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒Q,8) +𝛾c(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	 ×	𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒Q,8) + 𝛽T𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒Q,8 +𝛽a𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Q,8 + 𝛽c𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒Q,8 +𝛽d𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑	𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦Q,8 + 𝜀Q,8  (7) 
 
i = the equity instrument 
t = the aggregation period, time interval of one week 𝛼 = intercept 𝛽MLd = the slope coefficient for the variables  
Dark percentage = the percentage of trading in dark pools 𝛾MLT= the slope coefficient for the dummy variables 𝛾aLc= the slope coefficient for the interaction terms 
Low dark percentage = dummy variable, (1 if mean < 11.90, 0 if mean >11.90) 
High dark percentage = dummy variable, (1 if mean > 15.55, 0 if mean < 15.55) 
Total volume = the total trading volume 
Market capitalization = the current market capitalization 
Average trade size = average dark trade size 
Lagged realized volatility = realized volatility for t-1 𝜀 = error term 
 
We expect the variables included in the first regression to have the same sign for this regression 
as well. The dummy variables are expected to have values different from each other, where 
high values will be greater than for low percentage of dark pool trading. For the interaction 
terms, we expect the slope coefficients to be different from each other. Whereas the one for low 
dark percentage would be negative and the one for high dark percent to be positive. This would 
indicate that a low dark percentage have a smaller impact on price volatility than a high dark 
percentage in relation to the benchmark group of medium dark percentage.   
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5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the output of the regression models constructed in previous sections 
followed by the results of the hypotheses tests.  
 
5.1. Hypothesis I 
Table 2. Results from regression I 
Number of observations  22,200 
Number of groups  100 
F(226, 21872)  35.36 
Prob > F  0.0000 
Within R-squared  0.2676 
Between R-squared  0.1618 
Overall R-squared  0.2301 
Realized volatility Coefficient P-value 
Constant 1.229284** 0.000 
Dark percentage 0.0120112** 0.000 
Total volume 0.000000026** 0.000 
Market cap. 0.000000931 0.140 
Avg. trade size -0.0011695** 0.000 
Lag RV 0.0744556** 0.000 
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Note to table 2: Dark percentage is the percentage of dark pool trading relative to total trading, Avg. 
trade size is the average trade size in the dark market and Lag RV is the lagged value of the realized 
volatility for one time period, in this case a week. In addition to this, the related p-values are reported.  
**significant at a 1% level 
 
The regression is provided in order to analyze the relationship between realized volatility and 
dark pool trading activity. As the Null hypothesis is formulated: The percentage of dark pools 
relative to the total volume of shares traded does not affect the volatility of asset prices. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are therefore established as below: 
 𝐻l:	𝛽M = 0 𝐻n:	𝛽M ≠ 0 
 
As the results from the regression imply the variable of interest, dark pool trading as a 
percentage of the total trading (dark percentage), is positively correlated to volatility. The 
coefficient received is 0.012 which means that the effect of a 1% increase in dark pool trading 
relative to total trading indicates a 0.012% increase in volatility, all else equal. 
 
As the p-value (0.000) implies the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Hence, the proportion of dark pools 
relative to the total volume of shares traded does affect the volatility of asset prices. Further, 
the model produced in Stata automatically provides an F-test. Prob > F 0.000 means that the 
estimated coefficient are statistically significant, with a certainty above 99.999%. 
 
In fixed effect regressions, the within 𝑅T rather than another measure of 𝑅T is of interest. This 
regression model provides a within 𝑅T of 0.2676, which means that the variance within the 
panel units in this model accounts for 26.76%.  
 
5.2. Hypothesis II 
Table 3. Results from regression II 
Number of observations  22,200 
Number of groups  100 
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F(228, 21969)  48.65 
Prob > F  0.0000 
R-squared  0.3375 
Realized volatility Coefficient P-value 
Constant 1.213376** 0.000 
Dark percentage 0.0093887** 0.000 
Low dark percentage -0.0216083 0.678 
High dark percentage -0.1142061** 0.002 
Low*Dark percentage -0.0105619* 0.016 
High*Dark percentage 0.0137982** 0.000 
Total volume 0.0000000218** 0.000 
Market cap. -0.00000348** 0.000 
Avg. trade size -0.0023315** 0.000 
Lag RV 0.2645634** 0.000 
Note to table 3: Dark percentage is the percentage of dark pool trading relative to total trading. 
Low*Dark percentage is the interaction term between the dummy variable, Low dark percentage (1 if 
mean < 11.9, 0 if mean >11.9) and the percentage of dark pool trading, High*Dark percentage is the 
interaction term between the dummy variable High dark percentage (1 if mean > 15.5, 0 if mean < 15.5) 
and the percentage of dark pool trading. Avg. trade size is the average trade size in the dark market and 
Lag RV is the lagged value of the realized volatility for one time period, in this case a week. In addition 
to this, the related p-values are reported.  
*significant at a 5% level 
**significant at a 1% level 
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The regression is provided in order to further analyze the relationship between realized 
volatility and dark pool trading activity. As the second null hypothesis is formulated: The 
relative effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility will not change regardless of the 
proportion dark pool trading relative to the total volume of shares traded, the null and alternative 
hypotheses is established as below: 
 𝐻l	𝛾M = 𝛾T = 𝛾a = 𝛾c = 0 𝐻n:	𝛾µ ≠ 0	for at least one µ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 
By including dummy variables, as well as interaction terms to the regression model, will allow 
for groups of high and low values of the mean to affect both the intercept and the marginal 
effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility. For equity instruments with high dark pool 
trading, the marginal effect is 0.023 (0.009 + 0.014) relative medium. In the same time, the 
intercept is reduced in relation to medium with an estimate for the intercept of high dark pool 
trading of 1.099 (1.213 - 0.114). All of this with a significance at a 1% level. 
 
There is no significant difference in the intercept between low levels of dark pool trading and 
medium ones. Though, the marginal effect differs at a 5% significance level. Indicating a slope 
coefficient for low levels of dark pool trading of -0.001 (0.009-0.011). Hence, a reduced impact 
in comparison to medium levels of dark pool trading.  
 
To test the hypothesis stated above the joint significance of the variables are tested. The F-test 
of the variables provides an F-statistics of 33.49 which indicates that we can reject the null 
hypothesis at a 1% significance level. 
 
This regression model provides an 𝑅T value of 0.3375 meaning that 33.75% of the model is 
explained by the variables included.   
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6. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the result provided in the previous section. We construct a critical 
discussion in order to describe the shortcomings of the study. After that, we discuss the 
hypotheses and the empirical results reached. 
 
6.1. Critical discussion 
As already pointed out the data collected from FINRA is data reported from ATSs. Dark pools 
are only one type of an alternative trading system. However, in studies, the concepts of ATS 
and dark pools are often referred to as a proxy because of the lack of transparency which will 
be consistent even for this thesis.  
  
Realized volatility is often calculated using intraday data. This is done in order to catch all 
movements of the asset price which will provide an accurate measure of the intraday or daily 
return. By using the daily return to calculate the realized volatility over the week might not 
provide the same accuracy. However, since all accessible dark pool data was provided weekly 
the choice of weekly realized volatility was definite.  
  
There are some limitations in the data set regarding dark pools. In the sample of stocks provided 
a few stocks have periods of no dark pool activity. By basing the random sample on stocks 
where dark pool activity is consistent through the whole time span may have an impact on the 
result. Same goes for the calculation of the mean values. Because of some shares absence of 
dark pool trading during certain time spans, we exclude these periods from the mean values. It 
is done to keep the mean from being deceptive i.e. long time periods of non-dark pool trading 
will decrease the means, sometimes severe. 
  
Further, the only accessible data found was presented weekly. The results might be different if 
using a shorter time span. A dataset with daily or even intraday data would be preferred in order 
to account for the volatility in a more reliable way. Also, the accessible time period of the data 
was four years, to extend the sample using a longer time period would probably increase the 
accuracy of the test. When using time series, a long period is needed to find repeated reactions. 
However, this could be offset by the fact that the data set is of panel type. When using panel 
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data, these repeated reactions are found by looking at the reactions of the different cross-
sectional units, in this case, 100 different stocks.   
 
6.2. Hypothesis I and hypothesis II 
As stated earlier, the first null hypothesis can be rejected, meaning that dark trading has an 
impact on asset price volatility. The results indicate an increase of 0.012% in asset price 
volatility for a 1% increase of dark pool trading. It doesn’t seem like a large influence, though, 
in a very stable share this could anyway have an impact.  
  
Further, the second null hypothesis is also rejected, stating that the extent of dark pool trading 
has a different impact on asset price volatility. In contrast to the first regression model, the 
second regression shows an association between dark pool trading and asset price volatility 
dependent on the quantity of trading. The second regression model shows that low percentage 
of dark pool trading relative medium percentages will reduce the volatility. For high 
percentages of dark pool trading, the slope is higher than for medium percentages, however, 
with a lower intercept. Anyway, the differences in the intercept will soon be outweighed by the 
marginal effect and high percentages will have a larger impact on the price volatility than 
medium ones.  
  
The results for the first regression model as well as for medium and high percentages of dark 
pool trading concur with the results of Garvey, Huang, and Wu (2016) as well as O’Hara and 
Ye (2011). Both of these studies suggest a positive correlation between volatility and dark pool 
trading. Furthermore, they give no further explanation of the reason for this correlation. 
Though, Petrescu and Wedow (2017) explain the relation as, when orders are relocated from 
public exchanges into dark pools, the information in the public order books are reduced. Since 
prices are formed in order books, less information in the price formation might lead to increased 
price volatility.   
 
The result of the second regression model corroborate with those of Ye (2009), Buti, Rindi, and 
Werner (2011), and Foley, Malinova and Park (2013) but only up to a certain point. They all 
imply that the volatility decreases when dark trading increase, which corresponds with the result 
of the interaction term for low percentage of dark trading in relation to medium percentage. 
Such relation is explained by the theory of different type of traders. The implication is that 
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informed traders will concentrate on the public exchange and uninformed traders will relocate 
to dark markets in order to make a profit. A larger concentration of informed traders on the 
public exchange will improve price formation and reduce price volatility (Zhu, 2013). Further, 
Foley and Putniņš (2016) find evidence that a one-sided system will reduce price volatility. 
Since the one-sided dark pool markets seem to be the most common on the US equity market 
this might be another explanatory factor for the result, in line with theory implications.   
 
Our results regarding the decreasing asset price volatility for low percentage of dark trading 
relative medium percentage could be explained by the behavior of different types of investors 
as well as different kinds of markets, as mentioned earlier. In addition to this, we speculate that 
the lack of transparency in dark pools used to reduce market impact and volatility in asset prices 
also could be an explanation. On the other hand, when dark trading is increased a negative effect 
of reduced information in market prices could follow. When traders relocate to the dark 
markets, available information will decrease. Since asset prices on the public market are based 
on this information, the volatility will be affected and increased. As dark pool trading goes up, 
this effect will plausibly increase and thereby offset the positive effect of reduced market 
impact.  
 
The reason for these different results could be explained by a number of reasons. First, the 
studies are performed on different markets where different regulations, as well as requirements, 
has to be met which may affect the usage of dark pool trading activity. Foley, Malinova, and 
Park (2013) for example look at the Canadian market while Petrescu, Wedow and Lari (2016) 
are looking into the European market. Low percentages in our model denote a mean up to 
11.9%. For some markets, this infers a relatively high value already. For example, the overall 
market share of dark trading on the European market is below 10% (Petrescu and Wedow, 
2017). Therefore, some low, as well as medium values in our model, could already be classified 
as high values in the European market. This might be an explanation to why our results may 
differ from studies made on other markets. Second, the major variations in samples and sample 
sizes will probably affect the results. Where some studies using just a few stocks or only looking 
into one dark pool, as Ye (2009). Third, the different kinds of data set and the usage of different 
types of variables. For example, volatility is a measure that can imply a range of differences. 
Foley, Malinova, and Park (2013) uses implied volatility, rather than realized. Fourth, the time 
span of the studies differs at large. Since volatility tends to differ depending on the overall 
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economic situations, periods of examination may impact on the results. Fifth, the disparities in 
the choice of methods used for the performance of the study.  
 
By using the regression models provided we can only see linear relations between the variables. 
The results showed in the second regression model though might be an indication of a non-
linear relation between dark pool trading and asset price volatility. For further studies, an 
examination of a non-linear relation between dark pool trading and asset price volatility would, 
therefore, be of value. An exponential relation could also provide a preferred amount of dark 
pool trading in the aspect of price volatility. To consider the disparities when it comes to 
different types of dark pools as well as a different type of traders would also be valuable in 
future research. Since these differences may affect the market and stock price volatility in 
different ways. Treating all dark pools as a homogeneous group may be deceptive and to take  
different type of traders into consideration would further broaden the perspective of the study, 
in the aspect of explaining for different behavior patterns. It could also be valuable to conduct 
studies with a longer time span, other aspects of market quality than volatility as the dependent 
variable or the usage of other control variables that affects the volatility.   
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7. Conclusion 
By focusing on the effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility, this thesis contributes to 
the unexplored field of dark pool trading and the effect on public markets. The results have led 
to a broader perspective of the field but would require further studies to find the real causal 
relation of dark pool trading on asset price volatility.   
  
When looking at the result, the first null hypothesis stating that there is no relationship between 
dark pool trading and realized volatility could be rejected at 1% significance level. This in 
combination with the regression output suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
the dependent and the independent variable. These findings imply that the realized volatility 
increases with 0.012% when the ratio of dark pool trading increase with 1%.  
  
The second null hypothesis can also be rejected at 1% significance level, implying that the 
effect of dark pool trading on asset price volatility will change with the extent of dark pool 
trading. The regression estimate that low percentages of dark pool trading compared to medium 
percentage decreases the volatility of asset prices. In contrast, when the percentage of dark pool 
trading is high compared to medium percentage the volatility will be enhanced. These results 
suggest that there seems to be a threshold where the reduced asset price volatility due to dark 
pool trading will be canceled out by the effect of reduced information on market prices.  
  
These findings are interesting and supported by some of the prior research made on the subject. 
Our hope is that this will increase the interest for further studies related to dark pools, despite 
the limited access of data.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1A. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Estimated results Var sd=sqrt(Var) 
rv  1.276549 1.129844 
e 0.8207176 0.9059347 
u  0 0 
Test: Var(u) = 0   
Chibar2(01) = 0.00   
Prob > chibar2 = 1.0000   
Note to Appendix 1A: The high test result leads to no rejection of the test, hence a random effect is not 




Appendix 1B. F-test for fixed effects 
F test that all u_i=0:  
F(99, 22095) = 36.80  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
Note to Appendix 1B: The low f-value leads to rejection of the null, hence a fixed effect is favored over 




Appendix 1C. Hausman test for fixed or random effects 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 12050.62 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Note to Appendix 1C: The low test result leads to rejection of the null, hence the difference in coefficients 
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Appendix 1D. Testing for time-fixed effects 
F(221, 21874) = 16.02 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Note to Appendix 1D: The low f-value leads to rejection of the null that the coefficients for all time 




Appendix 1E. Modified Wald test for groupwise  
heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i  
Chi2(100) =  14858.29 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Note to Appendix 1E: The low test result leads to rejection of the null, meaning that heteroskedasticity 




Appendix 1F. Bias-corrected Born and Breitung (2016) Q(p)-test as postestimation 
Variable Q(p)-stat p-value N maxT 
Post 
Estimation 
21.03 0.000 100 222 
Under H0, Q(p) ~ chi2(p) 
H0: No serial correlation up to order 2 
Ha: Some serial correlation up to order 2 
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Realized volatility 1.0000      
Dark percentage 0.0539 1.0000     
Total volume 0.3242 0.0315 1.0000    
Market cap. -0.1327 -0.1998 0.2580 1.0000   
Avg. trade size 0.0692 0.7155 0.3400 -0.1149 1.0000  
Lag RV 0.3973 0.0223 0.2166 -0.1325 0.0361 1.0000 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Dark percentage 2.31 0.433548 
Total volume 1.49 0.672586 
Market cap. 1.19 0.843065 
Avg. trade size 2.63 0.379694 
Lag RV 1.11 0.904879 
Mean VIF 1.74  
Note to Appendix 1G: The values reported in the top part measures how the independent variables 
correlate with each other. Since all values are below 0.8 there is no sign of correlation. The values 
reported in the second part measures the amount by which the variance if the ith coefficient estimate is 
increased due to its linear association with the other explanatory variables A high VIF indicates an R^2 
near unity and hence suggest collinearity. Since all values are below 10 there is no sign of collinearity. 




Appendix 1H. Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence 
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence = -1.614, Pr = 0.1066 
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements 
= 
0.088 
Note to Appendix 1H: The null for this test is saying that there is cross sectional independence. The high 
p-value leads to no rejection of the null.  
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Appendix 2. List of stocks included in the study 
TICKER 
   
ABMD US 
Equity 
EPR US Equity MHK US Equity SLGN US 
Equity 
ADI US Equity EQIX US Equity MKC US Equity SON US Equity 
ADSK US 
Equity 
FDS US Equity MLM US Equity SPR US Equity 
AEE US Equity FHN US Equity MNST US 
Equity 
SRE US Equity 




FMC US Equity MSM US Equity STI US Equity 
AMGN US 
Equity 
GD US Equity NATI US Equity TCF US Equity 
AXP US Equity GDDY US 
Equity 
NBL US Equity TCO US Equity 
BBY US Equity GRA US Equity NBR US Equity TEL US Equity 
BDX US Equity GT US Equity NEM US Equity TER US Equity 
BK US Equity HON US Equity NKE US Equity TKR US Equity 
BKNG US 
Equity 
HPP US Equity OI US Equity TSS US Equity 
BOKF US 
Equity 




INFO US Equity PFG US Equity USG US Equity 
CLGX US 
Equity 
IONS US Equity PG US Equity USM US Equity 
CNA US Equity IP US Equity PPL US Equity UTX US Equity 
CTAS US 
Equity 




CY US Equity KSS US Equity PSA US Equity WLL US Equity 
CZR US Equity LBRDK US 
Equity 
RCL US Equity WMT US 
Equity 
DCI US Equity LNG US Equity REG US Equity WRB US 
Equity 
  33 




XEC US Equity 




XRX US Equity 
DVN US Equity LUV US Equity SCHW US 
Equity 
XYL US Equity 
EA US Equity LVS US Equity SFM US Equity ZBH US Equity 
EFX US Equity MAC US Equity SKX US Equity ZTS US Equity 
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Appendix 3. Example of dark pool markets 
Consider a fund manager, Investor A, who wants to sell 2 million ABC shares. If doing this in 
a public exchange, other investors may consider the large transactions as a signal to sell ABC. 
The consequence of such action might make it harder for investor A to receive the desired profit 
and the market price of ABC would suffer from abnormal volatility. To not cause a movement 
of the price in the public market, investor A would have to split the sell order into smaller 
pieces, the risk of such action is that the pattern is captured by companies using algorithms and 
the price of ABS is regardless starting to decrease. Investor A will therefore make less profit 
than intended.  
 
Imagine that investor A instead places the sell order of 2 million ABC shares into a dark pool. 
The dark pool computer system will match investor A with other investors placing buy orders 
into the dark pool to fill the order. In a dark pool with a limit-order system (two-sided) investor 
A will have to wait for a matching order at the same price to be placed or change the sell price 
himself and pay the spread.  The buy orders do not necessarily have to be placed with the same 
number of shares. If 20 other investors each places order with 100.000 shares at the same price 
as the sell order of investor A, the orders can be executed, and Investor A will receive the 
preferred amount. If only 10 other investors have placed orders of 100.000 ABC share each, 
one million of Investor A’s shares will be executed, the other million shares will be delayed in 
the dark pool, waiting for new buy orders to be placed.  
 
In a dark pool with a midpoint system the orders will be matched in the middle of the offered 
buy and sell price and investor A will have to pay half the spread.  
 
 
